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THE INFANT NUTRITION DEBATE: INNOVATION AND ITS ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL CRISIS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Nestlé kills babies. Or so it has been said.1 Of course, this conclusion has not
been proven in a court of law2—but that does not stop critics from attacking
Nestlé—a Swiss-based corporation—and other infant formula manufacturers for
their aggressive marketing techniques and other corporate policies. Parents,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other advocacy groups have villainized
the formula industry for reasons including concern about infant mortality, belief in
the biological superiority of breastmilk, and opposition to the general multinational
corporate state.3 Regardless, it is true that infant formula is a useful product for
some babies and some parents,4 even if there are potential dangers associated with
its improper use.
In the mid-1860s, Henri Nestlé formulated the first commercial “infant food”:
Nestlé Milk Flour.5 Since its advent, formula has situated infant nutritional
guidelines in a state of constant flux. While breastfeeding advocates continue to
forcefully urge that “breast is best,” the breastmilk versus formula debate

Mike Muller, The Baby Killer, WAR ON WANT (Mar. 1974),
https://waronwant.org/sites/default/files/THE%20BABY%20KILLER%201974.pdf.
2 See infra Section III.C.
3 See COURTNEY JUNG, LACTIVISM: HOW FEMINISTS AND FUNDAMENTALISTS, HIPPIES AND YUPPIES, AND
PHYSICIANS AND POLITICIANS MADE BREASTFEEDING BIG BUSINESS AND BAD POLICY 64 (2015)
(“Breastfeeding has . . . become part of th[e] package of ethical consumption choices made by socially
conscientious Americans.”).
4 See, e.g., Benjamin Mason Meier & Miriam Labbok, From the Bottle to the Grave: Realizing A
human right to breastfeeding through global health policy, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1073, 1080 (2010)
(discussing breastfeeding as a conduit for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)).
5 Lola Wilhelm, Nestlé’s Corporate Reputation and the Long History of Infant Formula, GLOBAL
HISTORY OF CAPITALISM PROJECT 3 (2019), https://globalcapitalism.history.ox.ac.uk/files/case12Nestléscorporatereputationpdf-1.
1
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continues.6 Scientists, policymakers, and lawmakers all have something to say
about infant nutrition. But the question remains: is formula itself the problem?
Moreover, is formula marketing really false or misleading? And is liability really
the most effective solution to the international infant nutrition problem?
This Paper will begin by exploring the history of formula marketing and
various noteworthy attempts to hold formula manufacturers accountable for their
questionable marketing practices. Next, this Paper will examine efforts by the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to regulate
formula manufacture and marketing in the United States. This Section will
compare the regulation of infant formula with other regulated categories, and it will
evaluate the utility of such regulation in solving the international infant nutrition
crisis. Last, this Paper will situate the regulation of infant formula in the context of
recent litigation. This Paper will conclude that innovation in infant formula, rather
than liability, is the most appropriate response to the international infant nutrition
debate.
II.

A HISTORICAL LENS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INFANT FOOD “FORMULA”
The development of infant formula encompasses a series of interactions

between formula manufacturers, parents, and physicians, along with medical
institutions. The breastfeeding versus formula debate has played out before

See generally KIMBERLY SEALS ALLERS, THE BIG LETDOWN: HOW MEDICINE, BIG BUSINESS, AND
FEMINISM UNDERMINE BREASTFEEDING (2017).
6
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Congress7 and the FDA8 but also before governments across the world.9 The World
Health Organization (WHO), along with the United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF), have attempted to unify marketing standards,10 but their guidance has
been conflicted—not to mention inherently limited.11 Ultimately, an understanding
of the historical development of infant formula is vital to understanding recent
litigation regarding formula marketing. The potentially misleading nature of
formula marketing has been a contentious topic since Nestlé was founded in 1866.12
A.

Pediatricians and Infant “Formula”: The Medicalization of Parenting

Mothers around the world have never been strangers to alternative infant
feeding options: wet nurses and other home-concocted infant foods have been
common throughout the centuries.13 In the eighteenth century, such methods were
a symbol of wealth and social status among the upper class.14 Birthing and infant
feeding were traditionally considered “women’s domains” to be supervised by nurses
and midwives.15 Over the years, however, formula and alternative feeding methods

See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 350a.
See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 106, 107.
9 George Kent, Regulating Fatty Acids in Infant Formula: Critical Assessment of U.S. Policies and
Practices, 9 INT’L BREASTFEEDING J. (2014), available at
https://internationalbreastfeedingjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1746-4358-9-2.
10 See generally WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL CODE OF MARKETING OF BREASTMILK
SUBSTITUTES (1981).
11 Megan Unger, Barriers to Fully Informed Decisions on Whether to Breastfeed or Formula Feed in
the United States, 31 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 183, 200 (2020) (“While the Code seemed like a
wonderful solution to such a serious set of problems, it was not, and is still not, as influential as it
could have been.”).
12 Wilhelm, supra note 5, at 3.
13 See generally Emily E. Stevens, Thelma E. Patrick & Rita Pickler, A History of Infant Feeding, 18
J. PERINAT. EDUC. 32 (2009).
14 Id. at 33. Interestingly, today the opposite is true: breastfeeding as become a symbol of class
status, with upper- and middle-class mothers having the “luxury” of time and resources to either
exclusively breastfeed or pump breastmilk. JUNG, supra note 3, at 8.
15 SEALS ALLERS, supra note 6, at 25.
7
8

3

Kimberly Johnson
International Immersion Program, Winter 2021

became medicalized by pediatricians who wanted to grow their practice by reaching
into the realm of infant nutrition.16 These pediatricians used scientific formulas to
alter the chemistry of cow’s milk—which is not easily digestible by infants—into
individualized compositions of fat, protein, and milk sugar that were amenable to
the delicate infantile gastrointestinal tract.17 Thus the advent of infant “formula”
grew from physician “humanization” of cow’s milk in custom-made batches.18
Eventually, the production of customized formulas by physicians became
inconvenient and costly,19 but standardized commercial formula was not commonly
available until the nineteenth century.20
B.

Commercialization of Infant Formula

Today, the standardized commercial infant formula industry relies heavily on
a symbiotic relationship with physicians and medical professional organizations.21
By marketing formula in physician’s offices and hospital settings, the formula
industry has benefited from the impression that formula is physician approved.22
Physicians, on the other hand, benefit from formula use when parents consult with

Id. at 26–27 (“Creating a replacement for mother’s milk was the foundation of the pediatric field.”).
Moreover, the move to hospital births, rather than home births, gave physicians additional control
over the infant feeding process. Id. at 36.
17 Id. at 26.
18 Id. Cow’s milk has a higher protein content and lower carbohydrate content than human milk.
Andrew J. Schuman, A Concise History of Infant Formula (Twists and Turns Included) (Feb. 1,
2003), https://www.contemporarypediatrics.com/view/concise-history-infant-formula-twists-andturns-included.
19 NAOMI BAUMSLAG & DIA MICHAELS, MILK, MONEY, AND MADNESS: THE CULTURE AND POLITICS OF
BREASTFEEDING 129 (1995).
20 Stevens, Patrick & Pickler, supra note 13, at 32.
21 SEALS ALLERS, supra note 6, at 29 (“An unholy alliance was formed.”).
22 Id. at 19.
16
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them about feeding practices.23 For example, because standardized formula means
that mothers can prepare commercial formula without physician assistance,
formula manufacturers initially distributed artificial milks without directions on
the package.24 The package merely advised consumers to consult their doctors
before using the product.25 Manufacturers touted this practice as a keystone feature
of their “ethical marketing” policies, which, they claimed, addressed the concern
that commercial formula is potentially dangerous.26
Yet there is no mandate that parents consult a physician before purchasing
infant formula. Formula products are widely available on grocery store shelves, and
distribution is neither restricted nor controlled by physicians.27 The FDA, for
example, requires that formula labels include a statement indicating that parents
should consult with their physician about the use of infant formulas, such as “USE
AS DIRECTED BY A PHYSICIAN,”28 but it is not clear whether this disclosure
affects behavior in any meaningful way, or is even read by consumers.29 Somewhat

See BAUMSLAG & MICHAELS, supra note 19, at 127 (“Several manufacturers were owned by doctors
and pharmacists. They wanted doctors to sanction their products, while doctors wanted to retain
control over the distribution of infant formula and share in the profits from this new market.”).
24 SEALS ALLERS, supra note 6, at 29. See also BAUMSLAG & MICHAELS, supra note 19, at 129.
25 SEALS ALLERS, supra note 6, at 29.
26 Id. at 29–30 (describing Mead Johnson’s claim that its ethical marketing policy “brought control of
infant feeding under the direction of the medical profession,” while noting that manufacturers
simultaneously benefitted from an “aura of medical legitimacy”).
27 Id. at 29.
28 21 C.F.R. § 107.20(f). The FDA has noted some problems with labels that instruct parents to
consult the formula manufacturer’s hotline with questions, rather than a physician; the agency has
determined that such an instruction does not satisfy the requirements under § 107.20(f). Food and
Drug Admin., Labeling of Infant Formula: Guidance for Industry (Sept. 2016),
https://www.fda.gov/files/food/published/Guidance-for-Industry--Labeling-of-Infant-FormulaPDF.pdf.
29 See generally OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE
FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014).
23
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paradoxically, access to prenatal care and a “close and regular” relationship with a
physician are associated with the choice to breastfeed rather than rely on formula—
at least in the United States.30 In fact, most women who choose to bottle feed their
children do so because of cultural and economic factors, such as lack of access to
health care.31
III.

NESTLÉ AND THE BEGINNING OF MARKETING HOT WATER

It is undisputed that marketing has played a huge role in the formula
industry’s success. But it is the controversial marketing of formula products in the
developing world, where bottle feeding is associated with an especially high infant
mortality rate, that has put the formula industry in hot water.32 This Section will
detail the international response to such marketing, including early litigation
against Nestlé and the WHO’s International Code of the Marketing of Breastmilk
Substitutes. This response to Nestlé’s marketing practices is what established the
necessary foundation for formula regulation in the United States, which is
discussed in Section IV. Such federal regulations are necessary because the
International Code has no enforcement mechanism; countries can disregard the
Code without international repercussions.33

Linda C. Fentiman, Marketing Mothers' Milk: The Commodification of Breastfeeding and the New
Markets for Breast Milk and Infant Formula, 10 NEV. L.J. 29, 52 (2009). Statistically, women are
more likely to breastfeed if they are older, college-educated, married, white, have health insurance,
and are not living in poverty or receiving supplemental nutritional assistance. Id.
31 Id.
32 See infra Section VI.
33 Unger, supra note 11, at 200 (noting that the voluntary, rather than binding and legally
enforceable, format lent to wider acceptance from member nations).
30
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A.

An Open Market: Nestlé and the Developing World

When formula entered the market, it was promoted as a “modern” substitute
for breastfeeding.34 But formula feeding is not perfect, even in industrialized
countries. There is some evidence that formula is associated with a variety of health
problems in even healthy infants, such as heightened risk of ear infections, nonspecific gastroenteritis, and severe lower respiratory tract infections.35
When infants are fed formula prepared with unclean water or improperly
disinfected bottles, the risk of bottle feeding becomes even greater. Contaminated
formula can lead to acute diarrhea, which depletes the infant’s nutritive stores and
contributes to further malnutrition and even, in some cases, mortality.36 While
critics argue that the dangers of formula stem from its inadequate nutritive
composition,37 the empirical literature suggests that formula-related harms largely
result from environmental contamination.38 Contamination concerns are especially
prevalent in the developing world, where parents are limited by inadequate
infrastructure.39 The fact that these infants are already vulnerable to malnutrition
compounds the potential harm of formula use.
For example, a contaminated water supply leads to contaminated formula.40
Formula feeding requires a series of steps: preparation, feeding, and storage.

Fentiman, supra note 30, at 38.
Benjamin Mason Meier & Miriam Labbok, From the Bottle to the Grave: Realizing a human right
to breastfeeding through global health policy, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1073, 1078 (2010).
36 Id. at 1081–82.
37 Id. at 1078–79.
38 Id. at 1080.
39 Id. at 1082.
40 Id. at 1082–83.
34
35
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Preparation requires clean water, which is mixed with the commercial milk powder
to create a liquid that is ready for consumption.41 The formula must be properly
heated to kill bacteria and other contaminants,42 and then parents need clean
bottles and teats to feed the mixture to the child.43 Afterwards, the family must
have access to refrigerated storage facilities to keep bacteria from accumulating on
leftover formula.44 The combination of poor hygiene, illiteracy, and poverty has led
to a massive formula-fed infant crisis in areas of the developing world, where
parents are unable to properly prepare, feed, and store formula or follow the
instructions to do so.45
B.

International Scandal and the Nestlé Boycott

In 1970, reliable data on infant mortality began to surface, highlighting the
link between formula feeding and malnutrition resulting in infant mortality.46 This
link was especially prominent in many developing countries, which lacked the
professional, legal, regulatory, and social oversight necessary to keep large,
multinational formula manufacturers in line.47
Around this time, a small number of firms dominated the formula market,
with Swiss-based Nestlé capturing 50 percent of the market and the remaining 50
percent divided between Abbott Laboratories, Bristol-Myers Squibb, and American

Id.
Id. at 1083.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. Note, however, that this is true even in the industrialized world: in Chicago, the combination of
pasteurization, refrigeration, and bottled and sealed milk reduced infant deaths from diarrhea by 84
percent. See SEALS ALLERS, supra note 6, at 29.
46 JUNG, supra note 3, at 38.
47 SEALS ALLERS, supra note 6, at 54.
41
42
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Home Products.48 Nestlé’s success was attributed in part to its particularly
aggressive marketing techniques, including formula giveaways and “Nestlé milk
nurses,” who dressed in nursing uniforms and walked around hospitals selling
formula to new mothers.49 Nestlé faced a wave of backlash for using these
aggressive marketing techniques in problematic environments like Africa and the
developing world.50
And then came The Baby Killer.51 The Baby Killer was a 1974 expose
published by the War on Want, a British NGO.52 This publication featured the
strong, provocative claim that infant formula was the direct cause of infant
deaths.53 It spurred international backlash to the formula industry and resulted in
an international boycott against all Nestlé products.54 The boycott was sensational
news and gained the attention of international organizations like the WHO and
UNICEF, who had, until that time, actively distributed free powdered milk and
other breastmilk substitutes, as well as legitimized formula use.55
Critics supplemented the boycott with the formation of INFACT: the Infant
Formula Action Coalition.56 To counter INFACT mobilization, Nestlé and other

Id. at 39.
Id. at 40. It is true that other manufacturers faced backlash and legal action due to their marketing
practices at this time; in 1976, Bristol-Myers settled a lawsuit for unethical marketing practices,
resulting in a public acknowledgement of its marketing practices in developing countries. Id. at 42.
50 See, e.g., MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS 146 (2007).
51 Muller, supra note 1.
52 Id.
53 Muller, supra note 1.
54 Wilhelm, supra note 5, at 7.
55 BAUMSLAG & MICHAELS, supra note 19, at 148. See also JUNG, supra note 3, at 46.
56 JUNG, supra note 3, at 42; S. PRAKASH SETHI, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE IMPACT OF
PUBLIC ADVOCACY ON CORPORATE STRATEGY: NESTLE AND THE INFANT FORMULA CONTROVERSY 59
(1994).
48
49
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industry actors formed ICIFI: the International Council of Infant Food Industries.57
In part due to INFACT pressure, the WHO issued a series of recommendations for
marketing in infant products.58 Nestlé and other ICIFI actors almost immediately
agreed to abide by WHO recommendations, which were endorsed by professional
physician groups.59 But critics insisted that still more needed to be done. The World
Health Association (WHA), a subset of the WHO, began discussing plans to draft
international guidelines for formula marketing.60 These guidelines would be more
forceful than mere “recommendations.”61 Still, at this point, the message was clear:
“baby killing” needed to stop.
C.

Trial for Libel and the Beginning of Litigation in the Infant Formula
Industry

In 1976, Nestlé put the baby-killing allegations to the test in a lawsuit
against the Third World Action Group.62 The allegation was libel: that Nestlé’s
employees and shareholders were being slandered by critics, culminating in the
libelous Baby Killer expose.63 Nestlé management hoped that a positive outcome in
this legal action would “put to rest the allegations once and for all, or at the very
least, to alter the tone and direction of the controversy.”64 This backfired. Instead,

SETHI, supra note 56, at 146. Note that ICIFI was disbanded after the WHO International Code on
the Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes was passed, discussed infra. Id. at 149.
58 BAUMSLAG & MICHAELS, supra note 19, at 161–62.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Maggie McComas, Geoffrey Fookes & George Taucher, Nestle and the Role of Infant Formula: A
report prepared for Nestle S.A. in 1982, at 8 (1982); see also SETHI, supra note 56, at 54.
63 McComas, Fookes & Taucher, supra note 62, at 8.
64 Id.
57
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the libel proceedings became a media circus, with the true verdict lying in public
opinion.65 Ultimately, the judge determined that Nestlé was guilty of violating its
“general moral responsibility,” with neither intent to kill nor culpable negligence.66
Still, the judge urged Nestlé to alter its marketing activities to “be spared the
accusations of immoral and unethical conduct.”67 The trial cast Nestlé as a
”corporation under siege,” “hiding behind legalities, evasive tactics, and
unwillingness to change.”68 Public distrust of formula manufacturers was higher
than ever.69
Litigation in the United States was similar to the European campaign:
breastfeeding advocates filed claims to protect consumers’ interests in the
developing world.70 In 1977, the Roman Catholic Sisters of the Precious Blood filed
a shareholder resolution against Bristol-Myers, requesting information on the firm’s
infant formula business in developing countries.71 When the Sisters received what
they deemed an “inadequate response,” they filed suit in federal court to force
compliance.72 The court declined to hear the case.73 Commentators remarked that
“this incident confirmed the lesson that Nestlé had learned in [the libel case]: the

Id.
Id. at 9.
67 SETHI, supra note 56, at 55.
68 Id. at 370.
69 Id.
70 McComas, Fookes & Taucher, supra note 62, at 10; also SETHI, supra note 56, at 59 (noting that
the entry of the infant formula controversy in the United States stemmed from the impact that
Nestlé was having on developing nations, rather than domestic concerns).
71 Id. at 10; Sisters of the Precious Blood, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 431 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
72 Id.
73 Id.
65
66
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critics had little to lose, and the companies had little to win, in such legal
challenges.”74
D.

The International Code of Breastmilk Substitutes

By 1979, the international consensus was that the infant food industry
needed to be restricted in its marketing tactics. Between 1979 and 1981, the WHO,
UNICEF, and other nongovernmental organizations met with industry leaders to
develop an international code to restrict the marketing of “breastmilk substitutes,”
as well as protect breastfeeding.75 The WHA adopted the International Code of
Breastmilk Substitutes (hereinafter referred to as “the International Code” or “the
Code”) in May 1981, with the United States casting the only negative vote.76 The
International Code is not binding, but member nations can use it as a guide to
implement national legislation and policy.77
The Code extensively outlines appropriate marketing techniques for infant
formula manufacturers. It prohibits advertising to the public, as well as the use of
baby pictures on advertising “to idealize” infant formula.78 Moreover, the Code

Id.
See DAYANATH JAYASURIYA, ADRIAN GRIFFITHS & RAYMOND RIGONI, JUDGEMENT RESERVED:
BREASTFEEDING, BOTTLE-FEEDING, AND THE INTERNATIONAL CODE 50 (1984) (discussing the Code’s
preamble, which asserts the right of every child and every pregnant and lactating woman “to be
adequately nourished as a means of attaining and maintaining health,” with an emphasis on the
importance of breastfeeding).
76 McComas, Fookes & Taucher, supra note 62, at 15 (“The sole negative vote was cast by the US
delegation, which cited apparent conflicts with the US Constitution.”). But see BAUMSLAG &
MICHAELS, supra note 19, at 163 (determining that the United States voted “no” on the Code due to
the industry lobby, with the Reagan administration focused on avoiding burdens on business).
77 See, e.g., BAUMSLAG & MICHAELS, supra note 19, at 164 (listing reasons why countries ostensibly
have not introduced the Code as national law: incompatibility with national constitution, low
priority, and interference by industry).
78 See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL CODE OF MARKETING OF BREASTMILK
SUBSTITUTES (1981), available at https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/40382.
74
75
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prohibits the use of free samples and gifts to mothers and health workers to
promote formula in health care facilities, as well as contacting mothers.79 It
requires that information provided to health care workers be “restricted to scientific
and factual matters, and such information should not imply or create a belief that
bottle-feeding is equivalent or superior to breastfeeding.”80
Last, the Code addresses marketing. It admonishes governments, health care
systems and workers, and formula manufacturers and distributors to scrutinize
formula advertising.81 It envisions an “essential role” for health care systems and
health professionals in guiding infant feeding practices, as well as encouraging and
facilitating breastfeeding using “objective and consistent advice.”82
IV.

FDA AND THE INFANT FORMULA ACT: THE UNITED STATES TAKES ACTION

But the United States did not ratify the Code until May 9, 1994.83
Breastfeeding advocates celebrated its ratification as a substantial win in the
formula fight.84 Still, the Code is not binding law,85 leading advocates to lobby for
other regulatory tools to oversee formula manufacture and marketing. For example,
in in the United States, the FDA extensively regulates formula under the Food,

Id. at 17.
Id. at 19.
81 Ctr. for Disease Control, Addressing the Marketing of Infant Formula 44,
https://www.cdc.gov/breastfeeding/pdf/strategy9-addressing-marketing-infant-formula.pdf.
82 SETHI, supra note 56, at 190.
83 BAUMSLAG & MICHAELS, supra note 19, at 169.
84 See id. at 163 (“When the United States voted to put profit making above human welfare, it sent a
message that strict enforcement of the Code was not required.”).
85 See, e.g., DAYANATH JAYASURIYA, ADRIAN GRIFFITHS & RAYMOND RIGONI, supra note 85, at 82 (“The
vicious cycle of poverty and malnourishment of the mother, and poor lactation cannot be resolved by
an international code, even if such code is translated into national legislation in every Member State
of the World Health Organization.”).
79
80
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Drug, and Cosmetics Act86 (FDCA). The industry is also regulated under the Infant
Formula Act of 1980,87 which created a new section for infant formula in the
FDCA.88 This Section will explore these regulatory tools and their utility in the
international infant nutrition debate.
The FDCA classifies infant formula as a “food.”89 Regardless, formula is not
regulated in the same manner as conventional foods.90 The FDA only requires food
to include ingredients that are “generally recognized as safe,” without testing for
nutrition. 91 Formula is different. Congress enacted the Infant Formula Act of 1980
as a response to a formula manufacturing scare in 1978, in which an essential
nutrient was missing from a reformulated product.92 Once the connection between
the faulty formula and the sick infants became clear, Congress began investigating
the incident.93 The investigative committee ultimately recommended that Congress
enact the Infant Formula Act to prevent a similar crisis from recurring.94

21 U.S.C. § 301.
21 U.S.C. § 350a.
88 21 U.S.C. § 412.
89 21 U.S.C. § 321(z). Commentators view this designation as odd given the large role that
pharmaceutical companies play in the development and manufacture of formula. SEALS ALLERS,
supra note 6, at 66–67.
90 21 U.S.C. § 341.
91 21 C.F.R. 170.30.
92 Toby Milgrom Levin, The Infant Formula Act of 1980: A Case Study of Congressional Delegation to
the Food and Drug Administration, 42 FOOD, DRUG, COSMETIC L. J. 101, 103–106 (1987). Syntax
Laboratories reformulated one of its soy protein-based formulas, and the reformulation omitted the
necessary amount of chloride, which is considered an essential nutrient. Id. at 103. As a result,
several infants were reported to have hypochloremic metabolic alkalosis, a chemical imbalance that
is associated with poor appetite, diarrhea, failure to gain weight, and blood in the urine. Id.
93 Id. at 104. There was widespread concern that the some of the potentially dangerous formula
remained on store shelves, even after being recalled. Id. at 105.
94 Id. at 106.
86
87
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The Infant Formula Act strengthened the FDA’s regulatory oversight over
formula products. It defines infant formula as “a food that purports to be or is
represented for special dietary use solely as a food for infants by reason of its
simulation of human milk or its suitability as a complete or partial substitute for
human milk.”95 The Act mandates specified nutrient levels,96 deeming deviation
from these levels to be adulteration.97 The Act includes stringent notification
requirements when the manufacturer has “knowledge which reasonably supports
the conclusion” that the formula does not provide the required nutrients or is
otherwise adulterated or misbranded such that it “presents a risk to human
health.”98 The Code arguably also played a role in garnering the necessary political
support to pass the Act.99
In addition to formula, the FDA regulates other products that are specifically
important to new parents, such as prenatal supplements.100 A “dietary supplement”
is a product intended to supplement the diet that contains one or more vitamins,
minerals, herbs or other botanicals, or amino acids.101 While supplements are

21 U.S.C. § 321(z).
21 U.S.C. § 350a(g). Certain formulas (termed “exempt formulas”) can deviate from these statutory
nutrient levels if specially formulated to meet certain medical or dietary problems. 21 U.S.C.
§ 350a(a)(1)(C); 21 C.F.R. § 106.1(b). These formulas are “not generally found on retail shelves for
general consumer purchase”; instead, they are “typically prescribed by a physician and must be
requested from a pharmacist” or otherwise “are distributed directly to institutions such as hospitals,
clinics, and state or federal agencies. 21 C.F.R. § 107.50(c)(1).
97 21 U.S.C. § 350a(a)(1)(A). Any formula that is not manufactured or processed in compliance with
formula-specific quality control procedures is also adulterated. 21 U.S.C. § 350a(a)(1)(C).
98 21 U.S.C. § 350a(c)(1).
99 See, e.g., Sam F. Halabi, The Origins and Future of Global Health Law: Regulation, Security, and
Pluralism, 108 GEO. L.J. 1607, 1621 (2020) (“Regulating corporations also shifted the global-healthlawmaking approach from making recommendations [via the WHO and UNICEF] to states to
directly regulating nonstate actors through law.”).
100 21 USC § 321(ff).
101 21 USC § 321(ff)(1)(A)–(D).
95
96
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“intended to affect the structure or function in humans,”102 they are not
“represented for use as a conventional food or as a sole item of a meal or the diet.”103
It is relatively undisputed that prenatal vitamins, such as folic acid supplements,
provide health benefits like reducing the risk of birth defects.104 Although some
breastfeeding mothers “supplement” their breastmilk with formula (rather than
exclusively breastfeeding with “natural” breastmilk), infant formula is not
considered a “dietary supplement” under this definition. Like conventional foods
and infant formula, the FDA does not require premarket approval for dietary
supplements, only premarket notification.105
In contrast, “drugs” are “articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease.”106 Drugs face the most stringent
agency oversight of the regulated categories. For example, drug manufacturers
must conduct thorough clinical trials to test their products before the FDA will
approve the product for the market.107 Still, despite clear differences in regulatory
schemes, courts have a hard time distinguishing “dietary supplements,” “foods,” and

21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(1)(A); Jovel v. i-Health, Inc., No. 12-CV-5614 JG, 2013 WL 5437065 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 27, 2013).
103 21 USC § 321(ff)(1)(2)(B).
104 See, e.g., Exeltis USA Inc. v. First Databank, Inc., No. 17-CV-04810-HSG, 2017 WL 6539909,
at *10 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017); Brown v. United States, No. 03-2282-JPM/STA, 2008 WL 859148, at
*4 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2008).
105 21 C.F.R. § 190.6.
106 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(B).
107 21 U.S.C. §§ 314 (detailing the requirements for applications for FDA approval to market a new
drug), 355.
102
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“drugs.”108 This problem became more pronounced with the advent of the “medical
food” category in 1988.
“Medical foods” are a subset of foods for “special dietary use” to meet
“distinctive nutritional requirements resulting from diseases or health
conditions.”109 They are intended to supplement a “conventional diet” by meeting
nutritional requirements “based on recognized scientific principles” that are
“established by medical evaluation.”110 Moreover, they are intended to “be consumed
or administered under the supervision of a physician.”111 Physician supervision is
defined as “active and ongoing medical supervision (e.g., in a health care facility or
as an outpatient),” with consultation “on a recurring basis.”112
A product’s regulatory category—food, formula, dietary supplement, prenatal
supplement, drug, medical food—is an important piece of that product’s regulatory
puzzle, with categorization having downstream effects on the manufacturer’s ability
to recoup investment and ultimately, effectively market the product. Formula’s
unique regulatory position in the United States, for instance, is a compromise

See, e.g., Acella Pharms., LLC v. First DataBank, Inc., No. 1:17-CV-5013-MHC, 2018 WL 7199992
(N.D. Ga. June 4, 2018), vacated, No. 1:17-CV-5013-MHC, 2018 WL 7199807 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 4, 2018);
Jovel v. i-Health, Inc., No. 12-CV-5614 JG, 2013 WL 5437065 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2013) (determining
that “dietary supplements . . . are a food and are not to be classified as a drug”) (internal citations
omitted).
109 21 U.S.C. 360ee(b)(3); 61 Fed. Reg. 60661, 60662 (1996).
110 21 U.S.C. 360ee(b)(3); 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(j)(8).
111 21 U.S.C. 360ee(b)(3).
112 Jennifer Shield, Jacqueline Kuhler & Abhishek Gurnani, Regulatory Constraints on New Product
Development and Approval Procedures in the United States, Chapter 7 from DEVELOPING NEW
FUNCTIONAL FOOD AND NUTRITIONAL PRODUCTS 127 (2017),
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780128027806000079. It is intended only for a
patient receiving active and ongoing medical supervision wherein the patient requires medical care
on a recurring basis for, among other things, instructions on the use of the medical food.
108
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between international breastfeeding advocates and industry actors.113 Advocates
have cheered on such strict quality controls for formula, arguing that they are a
symbol of the relative superiority and safety of breastmilk. They lean on the
International Code to inform national regulatory bodies of the “evidence-based
minimum standard” of “human-rights obligations for both states and companies.”114
Industry actors, on the other hand, counter that “formula is sometimes a mother’s
only option, making efforts to ban [or severely limit] its dissemination
unacceptable,” especially in countries where environmental risks, such as
contaminated water supply, are minimal.115
V.

INFANT FORMULA ACT: HEIGHTENED REGULATION AND ITS INTERPLAY WITH
SCIENTIFIC SCRUTINY
There is no denying that the potential danger of formula is less pronounced

in industrialized countries relative to their developing counterparts.116
Industrialized countries, including the United States, do not have the same
infrastructure barriers that have prominently resulted in contaminated formula in
Africa.117 Moreover, the formula safety scare that led to the Infant Formula Act of
1980 is better characterized as a development error rather than an institutionalized
infrastructure failure. Regardless, the formula debate remains contentious because

Halabi, supra note 99, at 1640 (discussing the practical implications of the Code, which “emerged
because . . . countries realize that their internal lawmaking processes are vulnerable to influence
from global firms”).
114 Id. at 1622.
115 Unger, supra note 11, at 207.
116 Halabi, supra note 99, at 1618 (suggesting that WHO recommendations regarding breastfeeding
are “not driven by nutritional variation between breastmilk and infant formula, but by improper
mixing practices prevalent in most of the world, often involving contaminated water”).
117 See supra Section III.A.
113
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infant mortality is inexplicably high in the United States compared to other
industrialized nations.118 Low birth weight is an important driver of infant
mortality, especially among mothers of lower socioeconomic status,119 who are more
likely to formula feed.120
Birth weight, however, does not completely explain the infant mortality
problem in the United States.121 Researchers have suggested that policies offering
support for mothers outside the hospital system may have helped to reduce infant
mortality on other developed nations.122 Particularly in Europe, there are readily
available programs that focus on parental education during the postnatal period; in
some nations, for example, health professionals commonly visit parents at home,
offering guidance and support in addition to wellness checkups.123 Parents in the
United States, in contrast, are left to make nutrition choices at home on their own.
Nutrition choices are perhaps more salient during and immediately after
pregnancy. For instance, studies suggest that pregnant women are more interested
in nutrition information than non-pregnant women.124 And there is no shortage of
nutrition information for new parents. The problem is that such information—

See, e.g., Joshua Cohen, U.S. Maternal and Infant Mortality: More signs of public health neglect,
FORBES (Aug. 1, 2021), available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/joshuacohen/2021/08/01/usmaternal-and-infant-mortality-more-signs-of-public-health-neglect/?sh=df289f83a508.
119 Alice Chen et al., Why is Infant Mortality Higher in the United States Than in Europe?, 8 AM.
ECON. J. ECON. POLICY 89 (2016).
120 See Fentiman, supra note 30, at 52.
121 Linda Englund-Ogge et al., Associations Between Maternal Dietary Patterns and Infant Birth
Weight, Small and Large for Gestational Age in the Norwegian Mother and Child Cohort Study, 73
EUROPEAN J. OF CLINICAL NUTRITION 1270 (2019).
122 Id.
123 Chen et al., supra note 119, at 108.
124 See, e.g., Ellen M. Szwajcer et al., Nutrition-Related Information-Seeking Behaviors of Women
Trying to Conceive and Pregnant Women: Evidence for the Life Course Perspective, 25 FAMILY
PRACTICE 99 (2008).
118
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particularly information regarding the formula debate—is both voluminous and
conflicting. Scientists have recognized the problem and have attempted to provide
empirically based guidance for feeding decisions. The Infant Formula Act (“the
Act”), rather than temper the debate and dampen concerns, has only incensed
formula advocates in the United States. Heightened regulation dampens innovation
and increases prices for consumers, as well as erects barriers to entry.125
Breastfeeding advocates, on the other hand, continue to argue for regulations
beyond the Act’s minimum quality standards.126 Such standards, they argue, are
warranted because breastmilk has “unparalleled immunological properties”127 that
lower the risk of stomach viruses, respiratory illness, ear infections, and meningitis
among both healthy and immunocompromised infants.128 They tout studies
suggesting the “intellectual[] superior[ity]” of children fed with breastmilk.129 These
benefits, they argue, last beyond infancy.130 In addition, breastfeeding advocates
emphasize that the benefits of breastfeeding extend beyond the nutritive and
immunological properties of breastmilk; the act of breastfeeding, they urge,

Trevor Kollmann et al., Innovation in Manufactured Food and Infant Formula Sectors, CTR. FOR
TRANSFORMATIVE INNOVATION, available at
https://www.foodstandards.gov.au/code/applications/Documents/A1155%20Review%20SD5%20Innov
ation%20in%20manufactured%20food%20and%20infant%20formula%20sectors.pdf.
126 See generally SEALS ALLERS, supra note 6.
127 Id. at 7.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Breastmilk advocates also argue that “[f]ood is programming”; “[i]ntroducing babies to minimally
nutritious, calorie-dense products, laden with sugar and salt, lays the groundwork for a lifetime of
overeating processed foods since . . . sensory preferences for tastes are developing in infancy.” Id. at
41. Such “unhealthy sugars” have been banned in Europe because of their “known link to childhood
obesity.” Id. at 18.
125
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strengthens the mother-child dyad, which is the “most basic yet significant
biological unit of humankind.”131
Such arguments demonstrate that the formula debate in the United States,
compared to countries in the developing world, has two fronts: (1) the potential
harms associated with improper formula use, and (2) the potential harms associated
with the use of a potentially inferior food at a critical time in development.132 The
problem, of course, is that empirical studies suggesting no inherent benefit of
breastmilk over formula are also numerous.133 The lack of scientific consensus
leaves parents with a dilemma: which studies do they listen to? The answer may
ultimately come down to effective marketing.
VI.

FTC AND FORMULA MARKETING: A POTENTIAL AVENUE FOR MANUFACTURER
ACCOUNTABILITY
In the 1980s, infant formula manufacturers began to advertise directly to

consumers in the United States, rather than focusing on sales to physicians and the
health care industry.134 In particular, when Swiss-based Nestlé entered the U.S.
market in 1988, it introduced a soy-based formula intended for babies allergic to
milk-based formula.135 While this formula was meant to be given to infants “only
under close supervision by pediatricians,” Nestlé marketed the product directly to

Id. at 10–11.
The latter dispute is analogous to other areas of food debate, where commentators exalt the
benefits of “natural” and “biological” food sources over more artificial alternatives. Id. at 5.
133 See generally JUNG, supra note 3.
134 Ctr. for Disease Control, Addressing the Marketing of Infant Formula 44,
https://www.cdc.gov/breastfeeding/pdf/strategy9-addressing-marketing-infant-formula.pdf. See also
Fentiman, supra note 30, at 70–71.
135 SETHI, supra note 56, at 7–8.
131
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consumers.136 Direct-to-consumer advertising was, at this time, “contrary to every
established marketing practice in the United States,” although formula was readily
available to consumers at the supermarket.137 Regardless, because Nestlé was not
listed on any stock exchange in the United States at the time, it was free of the
shareholder resolution suits that had “plagued” American infant formula
companies.138 Indeed, while American firms were subject to both federal and state
laws, the United States Nestlé subsidiary had essentially “nothing to do” with
either the production or sale of infant formula in the United States.139 Such freedom
insulated Nestlé from some of the national censure that hindered firms based in the
United States.140
Yet because Nestlé’s entry into the U.S. formula market was concerning to
American consumers, critics began to focus on the FTC’s regulatory authority over
product marketing as an avenue to hold the industry in check. The FTC enforces

Id.
Id.; Ctr. for Disease Control, Addressing the Marketing of Infant Formula, at 43,
https://www.cdc.gov/breastfeeding/pdf/strategy9-addressing-marketing-infant-formula.pdf (“Until
the late 1980s, infant formula was not marketed directly to consumers in the United States. Instead,
marketing efforts focused on the relationship between health care professionals and parents in
making decisions about infant feeding.”).
138 McComas, Fookes & Taucher, supra note 62, at 10.
139 Id. at 12.
140 SETHI, supra note 56, at 91 (discussing the 1978 congressional hearings on formula-related
marketing practices, which were spurred by Senator Kennedy and acted as the international catalyst
for the WHO International Code). Consider that it is not that Nestlé necessarily wanted to market
its products directedly to consumers rather than to physicians and hospitals; rather, Nestlé had
difficulty marketing to physicians because it is a food company, rather than a pharmaceutical
company with established medical relationships. BAUMSLAG & MICHAELS, supra note 19, at 181. Also
consider that Nestlé filed a lawsuit against the American formula producers alleging conspiracy to
block competitors from entering the market. Id. Nestlé claimed that their “ethical marketing” was an
artificial barrier to the market and violated antitrust law. Id.
136
137

22

Kimberly Johnson
International Immersion Program, Winter 2021

the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), which prohibits “unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”141
The FTC Act specifically defines “unfair or deceptive acts.” “Unfair”
marketing “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”142 “Deceptive” marketing is
more complicated.143 Deception requires a “representation, omission or practice that
is likely to mislead consumers,” “from the perspective of a consumer acting
reasonably in the circumstances.”144 The deception must be “material,” which means
that the consumers likely would have chosen a different product if not for the
deception.145 In the case of infant formula, the relevant consumer is new parents
and caregivers.146 Moreover, the FTC has determined that “failure to possess and
rely upon reasonable basis for objective claims” is an unfair or deceptive act or
practice under the FTC Act.147

15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).
15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
143 See Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Policy Statement on Deception, 103 F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/410531/831014deceptionstmt.pdf.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Jennifer L. Pomeranz & Jennifer L. Harris, Federal Regulation of Infant and Toddler Food and
Drink Marketing and Labeling, 45 AM. J. LAW & MED. 49 (2019).
147 Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Policy Statement Regarding Advertising Substantiation (1983),
https://www.ftc.gov/publicstatements/1983/03/ftc-policy-statement-regarding-advertisingsubstantiation. A “reasonable basis” might depend on the “type of claim involved, the benefits of a
truthful claim, the consequences of a false claim, and the amount of substantiation experts in the
field consider reasonable.” Jennifer L. Pomeranz & Jennifer L. Harris, Federal Regulation of Infant
and Toddler Food and Drink Marketing and Labeling, 45 AM. J. LAW & MED. 49, 50 (2019).
141
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The claim that infant formula products are “closest to breastmilk” is
commonly cited by critics as a potentially unfair or deceptive claim.148 They argue
that this claim is unfair and deceptive because the WHA, along with other
international authorities, recommends that marketing should not suggest that
formula is “nearly equivalent to or superior to breastmilk” or otherwise discourage
breastfeeding.149 Legal claims against such marketing, however, have not been
particularly successful under products liability law.150 They are ultimately
unsuccessful due to the lack of robust empirical evidence that breastmilk is truly
“better” than formula, as discussed above in Section V, when it comes to long-term
health and cognitive ability.151 But because international efforts to hold formula
manufacturers accountable have so far been unsuccessful, parents continue to bring
such claims.
VII.

THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF A LEGAL REMEDY

If the purpose of engaging in costly litigation is to incentivize safer and more
nutritive infant feeding, however, perhaps the most straightforward solution is to
instead spur innovation in formula manufacture. Such innovation would result in
safer product design and feeding technology. At the very least, such innovation

Id. at 50 (analogizing the formula to breastmilk comparison as similar to a comparison between
orange soda and freshly squeezed orange juice).
149 Id. at 50.
150 See, e.g., Hunte v. Abbott Lab'ys, Inc., No. 3:20-CV-1626 (SRU), 2021 WL 3679303 (D. Conn. Aug.
19, 2021); In re Gerber Probiotic Sales Pracs. Litig., No. CIV.A. 12-835 JLL, 2014 WL 1310038
(D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2014).
151 See, e.g., Hunte v. Abbott Lab'ys, Inc., No. 3:20-CV-1626 (SRU), 2021 WL 3679303, at *5 (D. Conn.
Aug. 19, 2021); In re Gerber Probiotic Sales Pracs. Litig., No. CIV.A. 12-835 JLL, 2014 WL 1310038,
at *8 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2014).
148
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could solve Nestlé’s baby killing allegation problem by making a superior product to
begin with.
Innovation is preferable to litigation in the formula context for several
reasons. First, because there is no consensus that formula is inferior to breastmilk,
litigation based on such a speculative harm is unlikely to be successful. Moreover,
even if formula is inherently harmful, industry innovators can work alongside
scientists to remedy the harm before it is empirically proven. This synergy is both
efficient and in the public interest. Second, innovation is preferable to litigation
because litigation directly inhibits innovation by siphoning away firm funds. When
firms are obligated to pay damages, such damages reduce the funds that formula
manufacturers might use to innovate. These firms can counteract the expense of
litigation by raising prices, which harms consumers.
In addition, innovation is also preferable to regulation. Regulation is merely
prophylactic and raises barriers to entry. Moreover, international “regulation”
through voluntary guidance by the WHO Code is inherently limited.152 Effective
innovation, on the other hand, diminishes the need for quality controls because it
results in a safer, and more effective, original product. Innovation ameliorates the
harms which regulation protects against. And regulation increases the risk of

See, e.g., Dominique Soguel, WHO Slams Baby Milk Industry for Rampant “Manipulative”
Marketing, Expatica (Feb. 23, 2022), available at https://www.expatica.com/ch/multinationals/swwho-slams-baby-milk-industry-for-rampant-manipulative-marketing-230718/ (noting that “[a]
crucial problem remains the inconsistent interpretation and application of the Code,” with Nestlé
only “guided” by the Code).
152
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compliance-based litigation, which, as discussed above, is costly and chills the
benefits associated with formula manufacture.
On the other hand, if the goal of costly litigation is not to incentivize safer or
more nutritive infant feeding but rather to manipulate public perception of formula
firms, then it is less clear that litigation and regulation fall short of their goal.
Formula lawsuits are part of a larger social movement that emphasizes “natural”
and “biological” foods, even where empirical evidence does not suggest the “harms”
associated with artificial alternatives outweigh the benefits of such products—
similar to the anti-genetically modified foodstuffs (GMO) movement, for example.153
Formula production benefits infants because it provides a cheap nutrition
alternative when breastmilk is impractical, unavailable, or unpreferable.154
Formula benefits mothers because it allows them to return to the workplace and
regain control over their bodies following childbirth. It benefits families because it
allows parents to engage in joint childcare, by freeing biological mothers from the
sole burden of infant feeding. These benefits are considerable.
Of course, an emphasis on innovation can still be accompanied by a
marketing transition. Historically, the public has seen direct-to-physician
advertising as a problem,155 but marketing directly to parents may present the
larger problem. Physicians, rather than parents, are better situated to discriminate

JUNG, supra note 3, at 31, 63 (“[Critics] operate on the assumption that eating is a political act
because the large-scale, industrialized, corporate farming that grows and produces almost all of the
food we eat jeopardizes not only our health but also the world around us.”).
154 Unger, supra note 11, at 207.
155 SEALS ALLERS, supra note 6, at 63.
153
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among health-related claims, given their training. Yet it is also true that direct-tophysician advertising can go too far: if the relationship between physicians and
manufacturers becomes too symbiotic, physician advice will become less
trustworthy and discriminating, and public perception of the industry will plummet.
Direct-to-physician advertising has two benefits: (1) it strengthens the link
between physicians and formula-related harms, which is ultimately helpful if
liability becomes the solution of last resort,156 and (2) it maintains parent-consumer
access to a beneficial product by forging a mechanism to temper parental
expectations, reducing credible legal claims for formula-related harms in the first
place. Direct-to-physician advertising may be especially preferable in the United
States, where most lawsuits are based not on improper formula preparation but on
the inherent inferiority of formula as a product.
The counterargument is that direct-to-physician advertising has been
prominently blamed for the ongoing opioid crisis, with studies suggesting that
physician marketing resulted in over-prescription of opioid products.157 This
argument is less strong in light of key differences between drugs and formulas:
drugs require a prescription, whereas formula products do not.158

Note that this Paper posits the ultimate conclusion that physician liability is not preferable for
consumers as a whole, although individual plaintiffs might prefer litigation as a remedy for their
unique harms.
157 See, e.g., Scott E. Hadland et al., Association of Pharmaceutical Industry Marketing of Opioid
Products with Mortality from Opioid-Related Overdoses, 2 JAMA 1 (2019).
158 See supra Section VII.
156

27

Kimberly Johnson
International Immersion Program, Winter 2021

VIII. CONCLUSION
At the end of the day, infancy is a unique nutritional context. Infancy is the
one time in life that a person relies on a single product to provide all necessary
nutrients. But it is not clear that liability for arguably misleading formula
marketing is the solution to unsafe infant feeding. Such litigation has historically
been unsuccessful, as the history of Nestlé litigation suggests. The most
straightforward solution to (albeit speculative) formula-related harms may be to
spur innovation in formula manufacture, leading to superior product design and
feeding technology. This is especially the case in developed countries, where formula
advertising is only arguably misleading. On the other hand, it is possible that
innovation is only the superior option in developed countries, where the formula
debate centers on the immunological and nutritional qualities of formula rather
than its safety. In developing countries, where safety is the dominant concern,
liability may be able to provide consumers with limited relief.
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